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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred by Article 
VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah, Rule 3(a) of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, and by Section 78-2-2, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. At the time Notice of Appeal 
was filed, jurisdiction for this appeal was conferred by 
Article VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the Constitution of Utah, and 
by Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(1) Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
ruling that Section 7-1-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, imposes strict personal liabilitv upon a person who 
signs a check drawn on the checking account of a corporation 
for the payment of a corporate obligation tfhere the signer is a 
mere employee of the corporation who has no interest, 
beneficial or otherwise, in the funds, assets, profits or 
business of the corporation, and wherfe such signature is 
affixed at the direction of the office of ^he corporation? 
(2) Should Section 7-15-1, Utah Cdde Annotated 1953, as 
amended, be construed to impose strict liability upon a 
corporate employee for the amount of a qorporate check issued 
by the corporation in payment of a corporate debt simply 
because the employee signed the check under the direction of a 
corporate officer where the corporate employee has no interest, 
beneficial or otherwise, in the funds, assets, profits or 
business of the corporation? 
(3) Would the construction of Section 7-15-1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, to impose strict liability upon a 
mere corporate employee without any interest, beneficial or 
otherwise, in the funds, assets, profits, or business of the 
corporation who signs a check drawn on a corporate account for 
the payment of a corporate debt constitute the taking of prop-
erty without due process of law in derogation of the rights 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment tb the Constitution of 
the United States and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution 
of Utah? 
- vii -
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Constitutional Provisions: 
"All persons persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisidiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the state wherein they reside. No state 
shall made or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." [Emphasis added] 
Amendment XIV, Section I, Constitution of the 
United States. 
"No persons shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law." 
[Emphasis added] Article I, §7, Constitution 
of Utah. 
Statutes: 
Section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, as enacted by the laws of 1981, 
Chapter 16, Section 13. (A photo copy of this 
section, verbatim, is set forth at the end of 
this brief as Addendum I). 
Section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
repealed by S.B. 134, 1981. (A photo copy of 
this section, verbatim, is set forth at the end 
of this brief as Addendum II). 
Section 70A-3-403, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. (A photo copy of this section, 
verbatim, is set forth at the end of this brief 
as Addendum III). 
- viii -
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TERRY J. STEPHENSON and 
JILL M. PAYNE, 
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JILL M. PAYNE, Defendant & 
Appellant. 
Cade No. 860268 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order granting plaintiff's 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, from the Judgment entered 
pursuant thereto, and from an Order Denyinb Defendant's Motions 
(Alternative Motions for Relief from 6rder, Amendment of 
Judgment, New Trial, Judge N.O.V., and bindings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law) in a civil action brought by Plaintiff 
against Defendant and Terry J. Stephenson under Sections 7-15-1 
and 2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. After 
Defendant/Appellant Payne filed two letters in the form of 
answers, the second one supported by an affidavit, the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding, entered an 
Order granting plaintiff's Motion fqr Judgment on the 
- 1 -
Pleadings. A Judgment was filed pursuant thereto. After 
hearing on Ms. Payne's Motions (Alternative Motions for Relief 
from Order, Amendment of Judgment, New Trial, Judge N.O.V., and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) the Court, Judge 
Daniels presiding, entered an Order denying said motions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company (hereinafter MST&T) filed a complaint in a 
civil action against Terry J. Stephenson (hereinafter 
Stephenson) and Defendant/Appellant Jill M. Payne (hereinafter 
Ms. Payne) alleging in Counts I through III that Stephenson was 
liable to them and in Counts IV through VI that Ms. Payne was 
liable to them, all under the provisions of Section 7-15-1 
(R.2-6). Both defendants were properly served. Stephenson 
failed to appear or answer, and Judgment by Default was entered 
against him on December 9, 1982 (R.13-14). 
Ms. Payne timely wrote a letter to counsel for MST&T 
referring to the Summons and explaining that she was a mere 
employee and did what she did under the direction of Stephenson 
(R.8). No further action was taken regarding the claim against 
Ms. Payne until approximately thirty-nine months later when 
MST&T filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the 
Alternative for Summary Judgment wherein MST&T contended that 
Ms. Payne answered the complaint but did not deny liability for 
the debt (R.18-19). 
Ms. Payne promptly filed another document and served it 
on MST&T1s attorney whereby she denied liability on Counts IV 
through VI concerning her, asked for dismissal of those counts, 
and clearly spelled out that she was acting only as an 
emanuensis for NAMCO Corporation (R.24) and supported said 
document with an affidavit (R.25). 
The trial court entered an Order Granting Plaintiff's 
Motion for Judgment (R.26) after a hearing in which Ms. Payne 
appeared, pro se, which hearing was not reported by the court 
reporter (R.29). Judgment for various amounts totalling 
$2,896.76 was entered on April 8, 1986 (R.$7). 
Ms. Payne promptly arranged for counsel through the 
Volunteer Lawyers* Project of the Utah State Legal Services who 
filed Alternative Motions for Relief from Order, Amendment of 
Judgment, New Trial, Judgment N.O.V., and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R.31-38) supported by the affidavit of Ms. 
Payne (R.39-42). 
Ms. Payne's letters (R.8 and 24), which MST&T 
acknowledges to constitute answers (R.19), and her affidavits 
(R.25 and 39-42) set forth facts from whicl|i it is clear: 
(1) That the checks in questiop were drawn on a 
corporation account; 
(2) That they were issued in payment of pre-existing 
corporate debts; 
(3) That she had no interest, beneficial or otherwise, 
in the checking account, the funds in the checking account, the 
corporation, or its property or business; 
(4) That she was a mere employee of the corporation and 
not an officer, director or shareholder therein; 
- 3 -
(5) That she was directed to sign and issue such checks 
by Stephenson, her superior and an officer in the corporation; 
and 
(6) That at the time the checks were issued, there were 
funds in said account to cover the check or Stephenson told her 
that he was depositing funds which would cover the checks; and 
that there were other employees authorized to sign on the 
account who from time to time issued checks against the account. 
After hearing on Ms. Payne's Alternative Motions, Judge 
Daniels denied the motions (R.47, 48-49, 70), expressing his 
reluctance to do so but concluding that Section 7-15-1 imposed 
strict liability and that he had no choice (R.68-69). 
The Minute Entry reflecting the hearing on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative for 
Summary Judgment does not specify whether the Court was 
granting Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or 
its alternative Motion for Summary Judgment. It merely 
recites, "that the Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment is hereby 
granted" (R.26). An Order, subsequently signed by Judge 
Daniels and filed, is denominated "Order Granting Plaintiff's 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings". Said Order recites that 
it is granting "Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings" (R.29-30). 
It is not clear from the file whether the Court 
considered Ms. Payne's Affidavit accompanying her second letter 
(R.25). At the hearing on Defendant's Alternative Motions, 
Judge Daniels stated that he "didn't really grant the Motion 
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because I didn't think her pleadings were adequate. I granted 
it because I thought she didn't have a defense." (R.58). Later 
in the hearing Judge Daniels stated, "I recall the hearing and 
I was under the impression she doesn't deny signing the 
checks." * * * "Well, I think she says in her pleadings, I 
don't think she denies it. I think there's no genuine issue of 
material fact." (R.69). Even later in the hearing Judge 
Daniels stated, "Well, I don't think you evpn can have findings 
of fact and conclusions of law in a - I don't think they are 
appropriate. I don't think it's an appropriate pleading on the 
motion for summary judgment for the reason that I stated that, 
and you know, I think I'll have to -- if you go up on appeal, 
I'll have to leave with what the pleadings say, but the Motions 
will be denied." (R.70). 
Judge Daniels declined to order or enter findings of fact 
or conclusions of law reflecting his rationale (R.69-70). As a 
consequence. Appellant is limited in her record to the contents 
of the District Court file and the transcript for facts and 
bases for this Court's rulings. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Jill M. Payne, one of the defendants below and the 
appellant here first contends that the Entry of Judgment in 
this case was error and that the Judgment entered by the trial 
court below should be reversed and the cas^ remanded for trial 
on the issues raised by Ms. Payne in her Answers and Affidavits. 
Ms. Payne second contends that the trial court erred in 
construing §7-15-1 as imposing strict liability upon her simply 
because she signed checks in payment for corporate obligations 
- R _ 
in behalf of her employer, NAMCO Corporation. Ms. Payne argues 
that such construction is inappropriate because (a) she would 
not otherwise be liable on the corporation's debts, (b) the 
statute as construed by the lower court is penal in nature and 
should be strictly construed, (c) such construction does not 
effect the objects of the statute nor does it promote justice, 
(d) such construction is inconsistent with §3-403 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
Ms. Payne's third contention is that construction of 
§7-15-1 as imposing strict construction on Ms. Payne renders it 
unconstitutional under the substantive Due Process Provisions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States and Article I, §7 of the Constitution of Utah. Ms. 
Payne's argument is that as construed, §7-15-1 is invalid on 
substantive due process grounds because it does not bear a 
rational, real, or substantial relation to legitimate 
government interests and because it is unreasonable and 
arbitrary in its application to her. 
ARGUMENT; 
POINT I. 
SECTION 7-15-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS 
AMENDED, DOES NOT IMPOSE STRICT PERSONAL 
LIABILITY UPON A PERSON WHO AFFIXES AN 
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE ON THE MAKER LINE OF A 
CHECK DRAWN ON THE CHECKING ACCOUNT OF A 
CORPORATION FOR THE PAYMENT OF CORPORATE 
OBLIGATIONS WHERE THE SIGNER IS A MERE 
EMPLOYEE OF THE CORPORATION WHO HAS NO 
INTEREST, BENEFICIAL OR OTHERWISE, IN THE 
FUNDS, ASSETS, PROFITS, OR BUSINESS OF THE 
CORPORATION AND WHERE SUCH SIGNATURE IS 
AFFIXED AT THE DIRECTION OF AN OFFICER OF 
THE CORPORATION. 
In its regular session in 1981, the Utah Legislature by 
S.B. 134 repealed the then-existing §7-15-1 and enacted §7-15-1 
as it now exists. See L. 1981, Ch. 16, Sec* 13. As enacted in 
1981, §7-15-1 (set out verbatim as Adderidum I) provides in 
pertinent part: 
7-15-1. (1) Any person who makes, draws, 
signs or issues any check . . . upon any 
depository institution, whether as corporate 
agent or otherwise, for the purpose of 
obtaining from any . . . firm . . . or 
corporation any . . . thing of , value or 
paying for service, . . . which check . . . 
is not honored upon presentment and is 
marked "Refer to Maker" or the account with 
the depository upon which the check . 
has been made or drawn, . . . does not have 
sufficient funds or sufficient credit with 
such depository for payment of the check . . 
. in full, shall be liable to the holder 
thereof. 
(2) The holder of the check . . . • wmuu has 
been dishonored may give written or verbal 
notice thereof to the person making, 
drawing, signing, or issuing the check . . . 
and may impose a service charge not to 
exceed $5.00 in addition to any contractual 
agreement between the parties. Prior to 
filing an action based upon this section, 
the holder of the dishonored check . 
shall give the person making, drawing, 
signing, or issuing the dishonored check . . 
written notice of intent to file civil 
action, allowing the person seven days from 
the date on which the notice was mailed to 
tender payment in full, plus a service 
charge is imposed for the dishonored check . 
(3) In a civil action the person making, 
drawing, signing, or issuing the ct^ eck . . . 
shall be liable to the holder of it for the 
amount thereon, for interest and all costs 
of collection, including all court costs and 
a reasonable attorney's fees." [Emphasis 
added]. 
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Prior to its repeal, the original §7-15-1 (set out verbatim as 
Addendum II) provided in pertinent part: 
7-15-1. (1) Any person who willfully, with 
intent to defraud, makes, draws or issues 
any check . . . upon any bank, banking 
association or other depositary for the 
purpose of obtaining from any . . . firm . . 
. or corporation any . . . thing of value or 
paying for any services, . . . which check . 
. . is not honored upon presentment because 
the maker, drawer or issuer . . . does not 
have sufficient funds in such account or 
sufficient credit with such depositary for 
payment of the check . . . in full, shall be 
liable to the holder of the check . . . in a 
civil action as provided in this section. 
(2) In such civil action the person making, 
drawing or issuing the check . . . shall be 
Liable to the holder of it for the amount 
thereon, for interest and all costs of 
collection, including all court costs and 
reasonable attorney fee. [Emphasis added]. 
Under the law as it existed prior to 1981, a payee 
seeking to impose civil liability upon a maker who signed the 
check in his representative capacity was required to pierce the 
corporate veil and, somehow, establish that the signer did so 
with intent to defraud. Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147 
(Utah 1977). 
Section 7-15-1 as it exists now, and has existed at all 
relevant times to this action, does not include the language 
contained in the pre-1981 statute, "willfully, with intent to 
defraud." Moreover, the language, "whether as corporate agent 
or otherwise" is inserted. Although the exact rationale of the 
Trial Court is unknown, for the Trial Court declined to enter 
or order findings of fact or conclusions of law, apparently 
these are the changes by which it is claimed that strict 
liability is imposed upon Ms. Payne. 
Apparently the Trial Court's position was that the 
re-enactment of Section 7-15-1 without the words, "willfully, 
with intent to defraud" eliminated the necessity that a 
plaintiff establish intent or fault as a prerequisite to 
recovery on a check. 
It is also apparent that the Court reasoned that the 
re-enactment of the statute with the additional words, "whether 
as corporate agent or otherwise" made the fact that Ms. Payne 
was acting in a representative capacity immaterial. 
It is Ms. Payne's position that in spite of these changes 
she is not subject to strict liability as an amanuensis for the 
corporation and its officers. 
Although the record is ambiguous witlh respect to whether 
the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings and 
whether the court granted the Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings or the Motion for Summary Judgment, the record is 
clear that an affidavit outside the pleadings had been filed 
and the court verbally indicated that he considered it. 
In the state of this record it matters little which 
Motion was granted. This court in considering factual matters 
should view all factual matters presented and all inferences 
fairly arising therefrom in a light most favorable to Ms. 
Payne. Young v. Texas Company, 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099, 
1100 (1958); Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Clearly. absent a determination that §7-15-1 imposes 
personal liability upon Ms. Payne, she would have no liability 
for the corporate debts of NAMCO. MST&T's pleadings allege no 
facts which would establish such liability under the common law 
or pursuant to statute. See Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, supra.; 
Stratton v. West States Construction, 21 Utah2d 60, 440 P.2d 
117 (1968); Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Inland 
Printing Co. , 26 Utah2d 19, 484 P.2d 162 (1971); Grover v. 
Garn, 23 Utah2d 441, 464 P.2d 598 (1970); 18B AmJur2d, 
Corporations §1829. 
A. SECTION 7-15-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, AS AMENDED, SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO 
IMPOSE STRICT LIABILITY UPON A CORPORATE 
EMPLOYEE FOR THE AMOUNT OF A CORPORATE CHECK 
ISSUED BY THE CORPORATION IN PAYMENT OF A 
CORPORATE DEBT SIMPLY BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE 
SIGNED THE CHECK UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A 
CORPORATE OFFICER. 
Section 7-15-1 is penal in nature since it does not 
directly relate to the loss which MST&T would sustain by reason 
of the violation of the statute. 18B AmJur 2d, Corporations 
§1847. Where a statute is deemed to be penal in nature it must 
be strictly construed and cannot be extended beyond the clear 
import of its language. 18B AmJur 2d, Corporations §1846; 
Waqstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931 (Utah 1975). 
The Utah statute governing statutory construction 
provides in §68-3-2: 
The rule of common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly 
construed has no application to the statutes 
of this state. The statutes establish the 
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laws of this state respecting the subjects 
to which they relate, and their provisions 
and all proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect 
the objects of the statutes and to promote 
justice. . . [Emphasis added]. 
The penal nature of §7-15-1 and the mandate of §68-3-2 
require that close scrutiny be given to §7-15-1 to ensure that 
the objects of S.B. 134 be effected and that justice be 
promoted. 
S.B. 134 was entitled "Financial Institutions Act of 
1981." Its descriptive heading recited that it was: 
An act relating to financial institutions; 
clarifying supervisory powers of the 
Department of Financial Institutions; 
subjecting previously unregulated financial 
services to supervision and regulation by 
the Department; limiting the jurisdiction of 
the Department to prevent overlapping and 
duplicating regulation; granting state 
chartered financial institutions the same 
operating powers as Congress has granted 
federally chartered institutions; providing 
for reciprocity with regard to the entry of 
foreign financial institutions, subject to a 
showing of public need; repealing certain 
chapters of Title 7 that formerly governed 
financial institutions; and providing an 
effective date. 
The bill further provided: 
This act repeals Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7. 
8, 8a, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 18 of Title 7, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and enacts 
Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 8a, 9, 11, 14, 
and 15 of Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953." 
Nothing in the language of the bill itself reflects the objects 
effected by the re-enactment of §7-15-1 in its present form. 
Nothing in its legislative history reflects the objects to be 
effected by the changes made in §7-15-1 or the other sections 
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of that Chapter 15. Resort to the record of the discussion and 
debate of S.B. 134 on the floor discloses that Chapter 15 was 
not even discussed. 
The author of this brief has been unable to find any 
cases in this state which cast any light on what objects are to 
be effected by, or which construe, §7-15-1 in its present form 
nor has he been able to find comparable statutory provisions in 
other states. 
In a case of first impression construing Section 38-1-3, 
a mechanics1 lien statute. Justice Crockett wrote for a 
unanimous court: 
"When uncertainty exists as to the 
interpretation and application of a statute, 
it is appropriate to look to its purpose in 
the light of its background and history, and 
also to the effect it will have in practical 
application." Stanton Transportation Co. v. 
Davis, 9 Utah2d 184, 341 P.2d 207, 209 
(1959) . 
Judge Crockett's opinion went on: 
"While it is true that our statutes are to 
be liberally construed to give effect to 
their purpose and to promote justice, it is 
equally true that they should not be 
distorted beyond the intent of the 
legislature. This principle is particularly 
applicable in a situation of this kind where 
a liability is imposed upon a property owner 
beyond what he contracted to bear for the 
Improvement of his property. In order to 
impose upon him such additional burdens the 
law must clearly spell out the 
responsibility." [Emphasis added]. 
* * * 
". . . If a departure from the traditional 
coverage of the lien laws is to be effected 
it should be by a clearer manifestation of 
_ i ? _ 
intent of the legislature than i^ shown in 
the manner in which this statute has come to 
its present form." [Emphasis abided] 341 
P.2d at 210. 
The opinion goes on to discuss the purpose and effect of 
Section 38-1-3: 
" . . . the statute was purposed to protect a 
contractor or laborer from loss for labor or 
materials actually used on the job, but was 
not intended to permit one to furnish 
himself with permanent equipment while 
working on a job and claim a lien on that 
property. To hold otherwise could lead to 
inequitable results and would accommodate 
itself to machinations to fleece a property 
holder. . ." 341 P.2d at 211. 
In State v. One Porsche Two-Door. Etc.. 526 P.2d 917 
(Utah 1974). this court was confronted with the construction of 
Section 58-37-13. the controlled substances forfeiture 
statute. In that case the owner of the vehicle was arrested in 
possession of one ounce of marijuana and forfeiture of a 
$10,000 automobile was sought by the state. In that case 
Justice Henriod. writing for a divided court, wrote: 
" . . . it is conceded that basis for the 
charge is that one ounce of marijuana was 
being carried by Price [the owner] who was a 
university student in Lawrence. Kansas. But 
it is undisputed that his sole purpose for 
being in Utah was to visit the Arches 
National Monument. -- not to transport a 
controlled substance." [Emphasis by the 
court]. 526 P.2d at 918. 
Justice Henriod later wrote: 
"This whole case leads to an unconscionable 
forfeiture, and that the trial court was 
correct in concluding that the enormity of 
the forfeiture [a Porsche automobile valued 
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at $10,000] hardly could fit the $299 
misdemeanor." 526 P.2d at 918. 
Quoting from Masich v. U. S. Smelting, 113 Utah 101, 191 
P2d 612 (1948), Justice Henriod went on to write: 
"'One of the cardinal principles of 
statutory construction is that the courts 
will look to the reason, spirit, and sense 
of the legislation, as indicated by the 
entire context and subject matter of the 
statute dealing with the subject.,,, 
"The statute obviously can lead to the most 
absurd results, -- a reason this court 
consistently has pointed up as a valid 
reason for invalidation of a statute, or a 
refusal to apply it under particular facts 
making such application ridiculous. . ." 
526 P.2d at 919. 
If the object to be effected by the re-enactment of 
§7-15-1 in its present form is to give a creditor a more 
expeditious remedy against a debtor who pays the debt with an 
insufficient funds check than it would have in the enforcement 
of the debt where it had not been paid by check or otherwise, 
the statute accomplishes its objective without construing it to 
impose strict liability upon someone other than the debtor. It 
cannot be said that justice would be promoted by imposing 
liability for NAMCO's debts on Ms. Payne. 
If the object sought to be effected by enactment of 
§7-15-1 is to penalize any person who affixes his signature to 
a check under any circumstance which for any reason is not paid 
because of insufficient funds, it accomplishes that objective, 
but in so doing, and as so construed, is extremely harsh where, 
as in this case, the signer is not at fault. 
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position of Mrs. Payne of their property without due process of 
law. See argument under Point II below. 
If there are two possible statutory constructions, one of 
which will render the statute constitutional and the other 
unconstitutional/ the interpretation which will save the 
statute should be adopted. Critchlow v. Monson, 102 Utah 378, 
131 P.2d 794 (1942) . 
Surely the Legislature cannot be imputed to have intended 
that §7-15-1 have such broad and harsh construction. This 
court should adopt a construction of §7-15-1 which recognizes 
that the legislature, in enacting S.B. 134, had the object of 
providing an efficient remedy against an actual debtor and did 
not intend to penalize an innocent employee who signs a check 
at the direction of her employer. Such construction would 
effect the objects of S.B. 134 and would promote justice. 
B. CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 7-15-1, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, TO IMPOSE 
STRICT LIABILITY UPON A CORPORATE EMPLOYEE 
SIGNING A CORPORATE CHECK IN A REPRESENTA-
TIVE CAPACITY IS INCONSISTENT WITH SECTION 
70A-3-403, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS 
AMENDED. 
The law of governing liability on negotiable instruments, 
including checks [§70A-3-104(2)(b), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended], is found in §3-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(§70A-3-403, Utah Code Annotated 1953, £s amended, set out 
verbatim as Addendum III). 
S.B. 134 did not specifically or implicitly repeal 
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§70A-3-403 nor any of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. Indeed, §70A-1-104 provides: 
70A-1-104. This act being a general act 
intended as a unified coverage of its 
subject matter, no part of it shall be 
deemed to be impliedly repealed by 
subsequent legislation if such construction 
can reasonably be avoided. 
Section 70A-3-403, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
provides the method for determining when the maker (signer) of 
negotiable instruments (including checks) is personally liable 
on the instrument. Where a check shows on its face either the 
name of the person (corporation) represented by the signer or 
that the signer is signing the check in a representative 
capacity, §70A-3-403(2)(b) allows the admission of extrinsic 
evidence to determine the intention of the parties to the 
instrument concerning the personal liability of the signer. 
See Annotation: "Construction and Application of U.C.C. 
§3-403(2) Dealing with Personal Liability of Authorized 
Representative Who Signs a Negotiable Instrument in His Own 
Name", 97 ALR3d 798 §§4[b], 8, 9, 10[b], ll[b], and cases 
collected therein. §70A-3-403 is inconsistent with §7-15-1 as 
construed to impose strict liability. 
Subsection (3) of §70A-3-403 establishes that where the 
signer of a check which on its face shows the person 
(corporation) represented and shows that it signed as 
representative, the signer is not held personally liable on the 
check. 97 ALR3d at pps. 830-832. 
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Section 7-15-1 can reasonably be Construed to avoid 
implied repealer of §70A-3-403 by construction which interprets 
§7-15-1 as merely providing an expedited remedy against a party 
who is liable under §70A-3-403. 
In order to construe §7-15-1 as imposing strict 
liability, it is necessary to hold that S.B. 134 repealed 
§70A-3-403 or at least amended it to eliminate checks from its 
application. Surely the legislature cannot be imputed to have 
intended that §70A-3-403 be repealed or amended. 
By enacting the Uniform Commercial Code in Utah, the 
legislature intended that the UCC be liberally construed and 
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies which 
are: (a) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing 
commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion 
of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of 
the parties; and (c) to make uniform the law among the various 
jurisdictions. See §70A-1-102(1) and (2), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended. The uniform application and the liberal 
construction intended for the Uniform Commercial Code would be 
defeated by the construction of §7-15-1 to impose strict 
liability upon Ms. Payne under the facts of this case. Such 
construction is not warranted (see argument under Point IA, 
supra) and should not be affirmed by this court. 
POINT II. 
IF CONSTRUED TO IMPOSE STRICT LIABILITY UPON 
A PERSON WHO AFFIXES AN AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE 
ON THE MAKER LINE OF A CHECK DRAWN ON THE 
CHECKING ACCOUNT OF A CORPORATION FOR THE 
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PAYMENT OF CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS WHERE THE 
SIGNOR IS A MERE EMPLOYEE OF THE CORPORATION 
WHO HAS NO INTEREST, BENEFICIAL OR 
OTHERWISE, IN THE FUNDS, ASSETS, PROFITS, OR 
BUSINESS OF THE CORPORATION, AND WHERE SUCH 
SIGNATURE IS AFFIXED AT THE DIRECTION OF A 
CORPORATE OFFICER, SECTION 7-15-1, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, CONTRAVENES THE 
DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS OF AMENDMENT XIV OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH. 
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States 
provides in part pertinent to this case: 
11
. . .nor shall any state deprive any person 
of . . . property without due process of law 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah, 
provides in part, pertinent to this case, as follows: 
"No person shall be deprived of 
property, without due process of law." 
For due process purposes, different kinds of property are 
not distinguished. North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 
U.S. 601, 42 L.Ed.2d 751. 758. 95 S.Ct. 719 (1975). "Property" 
includes a bank account which has been subjected to 
garnishment. 42 L.Ed.2d at 757. It includes a vested right of 
action. Hailing v. Industrial Commission. 71 Utah 112, 263 
Pac. 78, 81 (1927). And it includes the money or other assets 
of Ms. Payne which are subject to being seized in enforcement 
of the Judgment rendered by the trial court in this case. 
The (1) enactment of §7-15-1 by the Legislature. (2) the 
construction of it as imposing strict liability, and (3) the 
award of judgment in favor of MST&T under it by the trial court 
constitutes sufficient involvement by the State of Utah to 
constitute State action within the proscription of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, 
f,nor shall any State deprive any person. . ." [Emphasis added] 
North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, supra. See also. 
Annotation: "Supreme Court's View as to Applicability, to 
Conduct of Private Person or Entity, of Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment", 42 L.Ed.2d 
922 and cases collected thereunder. 
A law is considered as being a "deprivation of property" 
within the meaning of the due process clauses of the Federal 
and State Constitutions if it deprives an owner of one of the 
essential attributes of property, or destroys its value, or 
restricts or interrupts its common, necessary or profitable 
use, or hampers the owner in the application of it to the 
purposes of trade or imposes conditions upon the right to hold 
or use it, and thereby seriously impairs its value. Bountiful 
City v. DeLuca. 77 Utah 107, 292 P.2d 194, 201 (1930). 
The concept of due process, within the meaning of the 
State and Federal Constitutions, has a dual aspect, substantive 
and procedural. It is the main thrust of this point of Ms. 
Payne's Argument that she has been deprived of her property 
without due process of law and that such deprivation was in 
derogation to her right to substantive due process. 
Application of §7-15-1 to a person in Ms. Payne's 
position as imposing strict liability has the effect of 
requiring her to be liable for the debt of another (NAMCO) 
without fault on her part. See Argument uncjer Point I, supra. 
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A Legislative enactment is deemed invalid on substantive 
due process grounds unless it bears a rational, that is real 
and substantial, relation to legitimate governmental interests, 
that is public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of 
the public, or if it is unreasonable or arbitrary. See 
Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 7 9 
L.Ed. 1468, 55 S.Ct. 1468 (1935), applying the Due Process 
Provisions of the Fifth Amendment and citing Nebbia v. New 
York, 291 U.S. 502, 78 L.Ed. 940. 54 S.Ct. 505 (1934) which 
applied Fourteenth Amendment due process principles to State 
legislation; ABC League v. Missouri State High School 
Activities Ass'n., 530 F.Supp. 1033, 1047 (D.C. Ed.Mo 1982), 
Mominee v. Scherbarth. 28 Ohio St.3d 270, 503, N.E.2d, 717, 
770-721 (1986); Benelli v. New Orleans, 478 So.2d 1370, 1372 
(La. 1985); Department of Insurance v. Dade County Consumer 
Advocate's Office, 492 So.2d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 1986); Pace v. 
Thomas, 111 Idaho 581. 726 P.2d 693. 698 (1986). See also, 16A 
AmJur 2d, Constitutional Law §816. 
Decisions relating to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution are highly persuasive when 
interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution. 
Vali Convalescent and Care Institution v. Industrial Com-
mission, 649 P.2d 33 (Utah 1982). 
Just what government interests are thought to be promoted 
and protected by the enactment of §7-15-1, other than the 
regulation of financial institutions, is not apparent from the 
legislation itself. S.B. 134 was entitled "Financial 
_ 90 _ 
Institutions Act of 1981." Its descriptive heading, set forth 
verbatim at pages 11 and 12 of this brief, describes no other 
governmental interest or purpose. The trial court suggested no 
governmental interest in its rulings. 
If the governmental interest sought to be promoted by the 
enactment of §7-15-1 was the supervision and regulation of 
financial institutions, the enactment of and construction of 
§7-15-1 in its present form, as opposed to its form prior to 
1981, to impose strict liability, bears no perceptibly 
rational, real, or substantial relationship to that interest. 
Taking of the property of Ms. Payne and bestowing it upon MST&T 
is arbitrary and unreasonable. Railroad Retirement Board v. 
Alton R, Co. , 79 L.Ed, at 1476; Benelli v. City of New Orleans, 
478 So.2d at 1374. 
If the interest sought to be furthered by the enactment 
of §7-15-1 is to facilitate commercial dealings by providing a 
more expeditious remedy against a debtor, §7-15-1, construed to 
impose strict liability upon Ms. Payne, has no relation to that 
interest for the simple reason that Ms. Payne was not a debtor 
of AT&T and the construction of that statute to impose strict 
liability upon her is totally unreasonable and arbitrary. 
Bountiful City v. DeLuca, Supra. 
If the government interest sought to be furthered by the 
enactment of §7-15-1 is to promote commerce by penalizing 
persons who impede commerce by issuing insufficient funds 
checks, there is a rational relationship between §7-15-1 and 
that interest. There is no indication that the legislature 
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sought to promote that interest by the enactment of §7-15-1 in 
its present form and that interest is already served by the Bad 
Check Statute in the Criminal Code. See §76-6-505, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. Of the two ways of violating 
Section 76-6-505, the method proscribed by Sub-section (1) 
requires a culpable mental state, that is, knowledge that the 
check will not be paid by the drawee. The method of violating 
Sub-section (2) does not. on its face, require a culpable 
mental state. In fact, the provisions of Sub-section (2) 
remarkably parallel §7-15-1 in its present form. Of course, 
any criminal statute which does not contain a mens rea without 
some apparent reason for that omission is constitutionally 
suspect. Similar statutes have been held unconstitutional. 
See State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 16 ALR 4th 622 (N.D. 
1980). See Annotation: "Constitutionality of 'Bad Check' 
Statute", 16 ALR 4th 631 and cases collected thereunder. 
If §7-15-1 is construed to impose strict liability on the 
theory that it, in effect, creates an irrebuttable presumption 
that Ms. Payne issued the check willfully and with intent to 
defraud, it contravenes the procedural aspect of the Due Pro-
cess Clause. State Ex Rel. Cook v. Saynes, 713 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. 
1986). 
Construction of §7-15-1 as imposing strict liability upon 
a person in Ms. Payne's position serves no legitimate 
government interest. There may be legitimate government 
interests served by imposing strict liability upon debtors who 
sign checks in payment for debts that they owe or who sign 
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checks upon accounts which they own, in which they have an 
ownership interest, or over which they have control of the 
funds which go into, or come out of, the| accounts. But the 
construction of §7-15-1 as imposing strict liability upon 
others, such as Ms. Payne, to serve that interest does not have 
a real, reasonable, or rational relation to that interest and 
its application to someone in the position of Ms. Payne is 
unreasonable and arbitrary. MST&T dealt with a corporation 
(NAMCO), provided services to the corporation, billed the 
corporation for those services, and accepted the corporation's 
checks in payment of corporation's debts for those services. 
To construe §7-15-1 as allowing MST&T to collect the 
corporation's debts from a mere employee of the corporation is 
an unreasonable and arbitrary construction. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Daniels felt that he had no choice but to construe 
§7-15-1 as imposing strict liability upon Ms. Payne because she 
signed the checks and he did so in spite of the fact that she 
signed them as a mere corporate emanuensis
 r This Court should 
adopt a construction of §7-15-1 which is reasonable, and con-
sistent with the State statutes governing, and principles of, 
statutory construction, and not inconsistent with the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Under such construction Ms. Payne would not 
be liable if she signed the checks as a representative of the 
corporation who was not liable for the Corporate debts, who 
signed the checks under the direction of the corporate officers 
who supervised her, and who had no interest in the corporation, 
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its business, or the checking account. The substantive Due 
Process Clauses of the Federal and Utah State Constitutions 
require such construction. This Court should reverse the trial 
court's Entry of Judgment for MST&T and should remand this case 
back for trial on the issues raised by Ms. Payne. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ 2 — day of September, 1987. 
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(Section 7-15-1/ Utah Code Annotated 1J953/ as amended/ 
as enacted by Laws of 1981/ Chapter 16, Section 13) 
7-15-L Civil liability of issuer — Notice. (1) Any person who makes, 
draws, signs or issues any check, draft, order, or other instrument upon 
any depositor}' institution, whether as corporate agent or otherwise, for 
the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership or corporation 
any money, merchandise, property or other thing of value or paying for 
any service, wages, salary or rent, which check, draft, order, or other 
instrument is not honored upon presentment and is marked "refer to 
maker" or the account with the depositor/ upon which the check, draft, 
order, or other instrument has been made or drawn, does not exist, has 
been closed or does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit with such 
depository for payment of the check, draft, or other instrument in full, 
shall be liable to the holder thereof. 
(2) The holder of the check, draft, order, or other instrument which has 
been dishonored may give written or verbal notice thereof to the person 
making, drawing, signing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other 
instrument and may impose a service charge not to exceed $5 in addition 
to any contractual agreement between the parties. Prior to filing an action 
based upon this section, the holder of a dishonored check, draft, order, or 
other instrument shall give the person making, drawing, signing, or issuing 
the dishonored check, draft, order, or other instrument written notice of 
intent to file civil action, allowing the person seven days from the date on 
which the notice was mailed to tender payment in full, plus a service 
charge is imposed for the dishonored check, draft, order, or other instru-
ment. 
(3) In a civil action the person making, drawing, signing or issuing the 
check, draft, order, or other instrument shall be liable to the holder of it 
for the amount thereon, for interest and all costs of collection, including 
all court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
Historv: C. 1953. 7-15-1, enacted by L. 
1981, en. 16. § 13. 
ADDENDUM II 
(Section 7-15-1, as repealed by S.p. 134, 1981) 
7-15-1. Drawing* or issuing against nonexistent account or insufficient 
funds—Intent to defraud—Civil liability—Damages.—(1) Any person who 
willfully, with intent to defraud makes, draws or issues any check, draft 
or order upon any bank, banking association or other depositary for the 
purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership or corporation any 
money, merchandise, property or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary or rent, which check, draft or order is not honored 
upon presentment because the maker, drawer or issuer does not have 
the account with the depositary upon which the check, draft or order 
has been made or drawn, or does not have sufficient funds in such account 
or sufficient credit with such depositary for payment of the check, draft 
or order in full, shall be liable to the holder of the check, draft or order in 
a civil action as provided in this section. 
(2) In such civil action the person making, drawing or issuing the 
check, draft or order shall be liable to the holder of it for the amount 
thereon, for interest and all costs of collection, including all court costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 240, §1 . 
ADDENDUM III 
(Section 70A-3-403, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended) 
70A-3-403. Signature by authorized representative. 
(1) A signature may be made by an agent or other representative, and 
his authority to make it may be established as in other cases of 
representation. No particular form of appointment is necessary to 
establish such authority. 
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instru-
ment 
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the 
person represented nor shows that the representative signed 
in a representative capacity; 
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate par-
ties, is personally obligated if the instrument names the 
person represented but does not show that the representative 
signed in a representative capacity, or if the instrument does 
not name the person represented but does show that the 
representative signed in a representative capacity. 
(3) Except as otherwise established the name of an organization pre-
ceded or followed by the name and office of an authorized individual 
is a signature made in a representative capacity. 
History: L. 1965. ch. 154, § 3-403. 
